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 Increasingly conventional pension funds are considering ESG factors. 
 ESG scores of conventional and SRI funds are influenced by common characteristics. 
 The SRI-fund nature positively influences ESG scores. 
 SRI funds outperform. 
 A higher ESG screening intensity provides greater return and larger flows. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the increasing practice of considering environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) factors by conventional pension funds. We study whether the SRI 
(Social Responsible Investing) concerns are affecting traditional management. In an 
initial sample of 22 SRI and 221 conventional UK domestic equity pension funds from 
2016 to 2018, we apply the nearest-neighbour matching to account for fund-
characteristic differences, selecting 20 matched conventional funds. We then analyse the 
influence of fund characteristics on ESG fund scores, and the ESG-score impact on 
performance and flows with linear models. Our results show that the ESG scores of 
conventional and SRI funds are influenced by some common characteristics 
(age/turnover and expenses negatively/positively influence ESG scores), which are 
consistent with SRI features. Additionally, a higher ESG screening intensity provides 
greater return and larger flows. Nonetheless, SRI funds do not lose their identity, 
positively influencing into ESG scores to a greater extent and outperforming.  
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The evolution of the Social Responsible Investing (SRI) has generated diverse 
ESG criteria, producing SRI funds with dissimilar ESG scores (Joliet and Titova, 2018). 
Barnett and Salomon (2006) and Gangi and Varrrone (2018) indicate that SRI funds 
have diminishes the ESG standards to provide similar performance to conventional 
funds. Becchetti and Ciciretti (2009) argue that not too restrictive ESG criteria reduce 
SRI information costs and increase the limited ESG stock universe. Some studies notice 
SRI funds with low ESG scores because some funds include the SRI denomination to 
attract inflows (Cooper et al., 2005; Gangi and Varrrone, 2018; Kempf and Osthoff, 
2008). These conducts are understood by several authors as a convergence of SRI and 
traditional management, moving from a SRI niche to a mainstream SRI (Dunfee, 2003; 
Hellsten and Mallin, 2006; Revelli 2017). This raises the concern about the real ethics 
of SRI funds (Hellsten and Mallin, 2006). While the SRI niche selects ESG assets 
causing management constraint, the mainstream SRI pursues to integrate the ESG 
dimension into conventional management (Azoulay and Zeller, 2006; Revelli, 2017). 
Additionally, recent studies find that conventional funds are increasingly 
considering ESG criteria due to several reasons. First, the integration of ESG principles 
as part of the fiduciary duty has been internationally accepted (UNEP FI, 2009). 
Second, the increasing demand of stakeholders regarding their impact on the 
environment and society (Goy and Schwarzer, 2013). Third, conventional funds seek to 
restore the trust in their damaged legitimacy and contain the effects of crises (Gangi and 
Trotta, 2015; Joliet and Titova, 2018). Furthermore, the ESG integration is an 
opportunity to generate profits (Revelli, 2017). Consequently, the SRI niche may be 
crossing the border of conventional funds, expanding to the conventional-management 
mainstream.  
The latter behaviour may be noteworthy in pension funds, given their pro-social 
behaviour, long-term investment horizon, management of large retirement savings, high 
political profile, and common association with labour movements (Arnold and 
Hammond, 1994; Himick and Audousset-Coulier, 2016; Neu and Taylor, 1996; 
Sandberg, 2013; Sievänen et al., 2017). Sparkes and Cowton (2004) find that the 
adoption of SRI policies by pension funds has largely increased in countries such as the 
UK, one of the pioneers on regulating the ESG disclosure to enhance the importance of 
non-financial risks (Eurosif, 2017; UKSIF, 2018). Nevertheless, the SRI pension-fund 
literature is negligible (Ferruz et al., 2010; Siëvannen et al., 2017), despite the fact that 
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the motivation, objectives, time horizon, and clientele may differ with regard to other 
institutional investors (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  
This scenario raises the need to analyse the implications of including ESG 
concerns by conventional funds. Hence, this paper contributes on the emerging debate 
about the expansion of the SRI niche into the mainstream. In a sample of UK pension 
funds, we examine whether similar managerial characteristics determine the ESG scores 
of SRI and conventional funds, the importance of the SRI label, and the influence of 
ESG scores on fund results.  
2. Literature review. 
The growing concern of investors about the ESG impact of their investments has 
increased the accountability of conventional funds regarding their ESG investment 
practices (Armstrong and Green, 2013; Arjaliès, 2010; Crifo and Mottis, 2013; Hasford 
and Farmer, 2016). This trend raises whether conventional funds follow similar 
managerial and fund structures to SRI funds to integrate ESG criteria. Whether this 
conduct materializes, we expect similar fund and managerial characteristics influencing 
the ESG scores of both conventional and SRI funds. Specifically, the SRI niche selects 
ESG assets causing constraints, due to higher ESG screening costs, a limited ESG asset 
universe, and the long-term character of ESG practices (Azoulay and Zeller, 2006; 
Martí-Ballester, 2015; Revelli, 2017). Thus, whether the SRI niche spreads to the 
conventional mainstream, we expect higher ESG scores in funds with larger resources 
(size and flows), higher costs (expense ratio), lower performance, and lower volatility. 
Nevertheless, characteristic commonalities may also be due to the dilution of ESG 
criteria by SRI funds to generate similar performance to conventional funds, 
questioning the real ethics of SRI funds (Hellsten and Mallin, 2006; Revelli and 
Viviani, 2015). Whether the primary objective of SRI funds remains, we expect the SRI 
denomination to be a quality label to reach superior ESG scores. 
On the other hand, ESG fund scores indicate the required ESG standards. 
Superior ESG-scored funds usually face additional screening information costs and 
investment-opportunity losses, which may cause suboptimal performance (Aslaksen and 
Synnestwedt, 2003; Barnett and Solomon, 2006; Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2009; Gangi 
and Varrone, 2018; Jin and Han 2018). Although, as far as we know, no prior studies 
analyse the impact of ESG scores on pension-fund results, several works point out that 
the ESG screening intensity of SRI funds affects performance, finding mixed evidence 
(Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Bauer et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2006; Bauer et al., 2007; 
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Erragraguy and Revelli, 2015; Gangi and Varrrone, 2018; Ibikunle and Steffen, 2017; 
Lesser et al., 2016). In this line, we expect that the demand level in the ESG criteria of 
conventional funds will also affect their results.  
3. Data and methodology. 
3.1. Data. 
The data of UK domestic equity pension funds are obtained from Morningstar 
Direct and include the daily return, monthly return, monthly Total Net Assets (TNA), 
inception date, manager history, annual turnover ratios, annual expense ratios, a SRI 
dummy (which equals one/zero if a fund is a SRI/conventional fund), and four annual 
ESG fund scores: total ESG, Environmental, Social, and Governance, ranging from 0 
(lowest) to 1 (highest). Our sample period is from January 2016 to December 2018 
because Morningstar launched ESG fund scores in 2016. We exclude index funds and 
conventional funds without ESG score for robustness.
1
 We include both live and dead 
funds to avoid survivorship bias. The sample is formed by 243 pension funds, divided 
into 22 SRI and 221 conventional funds. 
We calculate the monthly volatility as the standard deviation of the daily returns 
by month. From the inception date, we obtain the monthly age. Monthly flows are: 
, where Rit is the return of fund i at month t. Flows 
are winsorised at the bottom and top 1% level to avoid extreme-value issues. From the 
manager history, we calculate the monthly manager experience, a team dummy, and a 
manager-change dummy. The team variable equals one at month t if a fund is managed 
by a team and zero otherwise. The manager-change variable equals one at month t if a 
fund experiences manager replacement and zero otherwise. The monthly four-factor 




Given the size differences between conventional and SRI fund sub-samples, we 
apply the r:1 nearest-neighbour matching method (Rubin, 1973) to select matched 
conventional funds. This matching avoids bias from inadequate comparison basis, 
provides fund-characteristic balance between sub-samples, and improves parametric 
statistical models (Ammann et al., 2019; Bilbao-Terol et al. 2017; Joliet and Titova, 
2018). The method matches the control individuals (conventional funds) to the treated 
                                                             
1 Morningstar does not rank all conventional funds, presenting data limitations. 
2
 The risk factors are from French’s website: 
https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
1-itit1-ititit ))/TNAR+(1*TNA - (TNA = Flows
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group (SRI) with the smallest distance between them on several characteristics (ESG 
score, performance, size, turnover, and expense ratios), discarding non-matched control 
individuals. The propensity score is used as the similarity measure between funds, 
estimated with logistic regression on fund characteristics. We apply a 1:1 nearest 
neighbour matching, allowing the same control fund to be matched multiple times 
(Ammann et al., 2019; Bilbao-Terol et al. 2017). Our matching provides 20 matched 
conventional funds.
3
 Table 1 shows that the matched conventional funds improve the 
balance of fund characteristics regarding SRI-fund characteristics (panel D).
4
 Matched 
funds present significantly lower age, lower turnover, lower expense ratio, and are 
handled by more experienced managers. SRI funds present non-significant higher ESG 
and governance scores, and significantly higher/lower environmental/social scores.  
 Insert Table 1  
3.2. Methodology. 
First, we examine the influence of fund and managerial characteristics on the ESG 












Where: ESGi,t may be: ESG_scorei,t, Environmental_score,t, Social_scorei,t, or 
Governance_scorei,t, which are the ESG, environmental, social, or governance score of 
fund i at month t, respectively.
5
 SRIdummyit equals one if fund i is a SRI fund and zero 
otherwise. The first group of characteristics is related to financial results: Alphai,t-1, 
Returni,t-1, and Volatilityi,t-1 are the alpha, the return, and the volatility of fund i at month 
t-1. The second group controls for fund characteristics: Sizei,t-1 is the logarithm of TNA 
of fund i at month t-1; Agei,t-1 is the logarithm of the age (months) of fund i at month t-
1; Turnoveri,t-1 is the turnover ratio of fund i at month t-1; Expensei,t-1 is the expense 
ratio of fund i at month t-1; and  Flows,t-1 are the flows of fund i at month t-1. The last 
group includes managerial features: Teami,t-1 equals one if fund i is managed by a team 
at month t-1 and zero otherwise; M_experiencei,t-1 is the manager experience in fund i at 
                                                             
3 The propensity score is the probability of receiving the SRI label, given the fund characteristics. We also 
apply a 2:1 matching, reaching similar empirical results; however, the balance between samples is poorer. 
These results are available upon request. 
4 Figure 1 shows the Q-Q plot of the ESG-score between samples and supports the balance of the matched 
funds. The remaining variable Q-Q plots also show this evidence (available upon request).  
5 We develop our analyses on monthly basis; thus, in the case of annual variables, we maintain the annual 
value for all months annually. 
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month t-1; and M_change,t-1 equals one if fund i experiences manager change at month 
t-1 and zero otherwise. Independent variables are lagged to avoid endogeneity.  
 Second, we study the impact of the SRI-fund nature and ESG scores on alpha, 










   (2) 
 Where: Fund_resultit is the alpha, return, or flows of fund i at month t. Timeit are 
monthly-time variables to control for monthly time-effects. The remaining variables are 
defined in (1). Clarify that the independent flows variable is replaced by alpha when 
flows is the dependent variable.  
 Model (3) separately analyses the influence of Environmental, Social, and 
Governance scores because contrary results between dimensions may offset results 










Where: Environ_scoreit, Social_scoreit, and Gov_scoreit are the Environmental, 
Social, and Governance scores of fund i at month t.  
4. Results. 
Table 2 shows the results of model (1). Panel A shows that SRI funds present 
higher scores than conventional funds. This evidence is consistent with our premise that 
SRI funds preserving their ethical objective present significantly higher ESG scores. 
However, SRI funds focus on/disregard the environmental/social dimension; that is, SRI 
funds present greater concern about environmental issues, and conventional funds 
concentrate on the classic pro-social purpose of pension funds (Sievänen et al., 2017). 
In general, funds with higher return, lower volatility, larger size, lower age, higher 
turnover, higher expense ratios, and suffering manager changes present higher ESG 
scores. These results are consistent with our initial expectations that top ESG funds 
apply more demanding ESG criteria, requiring steadier results, more resources, younger 
organizations, and greater ESG information costs (Jain and Jamali, 2016; Wang and 
Chen 2017).  
We further analyse the influence of characteristics by sub-sample. The non-
significant influence of financial variables (alpha, return, and volatility) in panel B 
shows that financial results do not determine ESG conventional-fund scores. Therefore, 
conventional funds are diverting from the traditional concern about financial results 
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when considering ESG criteria. Revelli (2017) indicates that the convergence of SRI 
and traditional management creates hybrid conventional funds, in which ethics is 
implanted in the financial purpose. In contrast, panel C shows an inverse relation 
between alpha, return, size, and the ESG SRI-fund scores. These results are consistent 
with the demanding ESG standards of the SRI niche (Azoulay and Zeller, 2006; Revelli, 
2017). The other results display some commonalities in the managerial characteristics 
influencing SRI-fund and conventional-fund scores (panels A-C). We previously argue 
that conventional-fund and SRI-fund scores will depend on similar features whether 
conventional funds integrate ESG criteria by following analogous patterns to SRI funds, 
or whether SRI funds reduce ESG standards. Our results are in accordance with the 
former; that is, the spread of the SRI niche to the conventional mainstream and the 
increasing ESG concerns of conventional funds. Specifically, the similarities found are 
related to SRI criteria, and the relation between SRI-fund scores and fund characteristics 
corresponds to the SRI-niche demands.  
Table 3 shows the results of models (2)-(3). Column 1 of panels A-B shows that 
SRI funds outperform conventional funds. Ibikunle and Steffen (2017) also note that 
markets overestimated the SRI risks, disregarding the potential SRI opportunities. The 
non-significant ESG-score coefficients in column 1 reveal that SRI managers are SRI-
niche performer specialists (Ibikunle and Steffen 2017). Columns 2-3 of panel A show 
non-significant SRI dummies and positive influence of ESG scores on return and flows. 
Although the SRI coefficients are not significant, we find that SRI funds present higher 
scores (Table 2), thus, the return and flows of SRI funds will also increase. 
Additionally, we should note that the potential profits (return and flows) of superior 
ESG practices may be attracting conventional funds to integrate ESG factors (Revelli, 
2017). Panel B shows that the positive ESG effect on return is due to the ESG 
integration (versus the non-individual influence, Ziegler et al., 2007), and the positive 
impact on flows is due to superior environmental screenings. Consistent with Sievänen 
et al. (2017), our results indicate that integrating ESG factors may provide balance 
between finance and responsibility in pension funds. 
Insert Tables 2-3  
5. Conclusions. 
The increasing practice of considering ESG factors by conventional pension 
funds raises the need to analyse whether conventional and SRI funds share some 
features in the ESG criteria applied, which lead to reach certain ESG level. 
         
9 
 
Additionally, we study the effect of ESG scores on fund results. In a sample of UK SRI 
and matched conventional domestic equity pension funds, our results show that 
implementing more demanding ESG strategies (i.e. higher ESG fund scores) requires 
more resources and costs, consistent with the ESG investment constraints (screening 
costs and limited asset universe). These findings indicate some commonalities in the 
managerial characteristics influencing SRI-fund and conventional-fund scores. 
Additionally, the similarities are related to SRI criteria; hence, conventional funds 
present similar ESG concerns to SRI funds. Nonetheless, SRI funds preserve their SRI 
nature, reaching higher scores. On the other hand, SRI funds outperform and higher 
ESG scores positively influence return and flows in both SRI and conventional funds. 
Consequently, the risk management of non-financial factors add value to pension 
participants’ savings. Nevertheless, the pension-fund industry should continue offering 
new funds in response to the increasing ESG concerns of participants and the 
development of the SRI niche towards the mainstream of conventional funds.  
Although this study provides novel findings, the significance of our results is 
limited by the data and valid for the period and country studied. To overcome the 
available period with ESG scores and the lack of ESG scores for some conventional 
funds, further research will be adopted by calculating ESG fund scores from the ESG 
scores of portfolio holdings. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 is divided into four panels. Panels A, B, and C show the mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum of the variables for all conventional funds (panel A), the matched conventional funds (panel 
B), and SRI funds (panel C) from January 2016 to December 2018. Panel D shows a comparative of the 
variables (mean) for all pension funds analysed (SRI and matched), the matched conventional funds, and 
the SRI funds. The last column of this panel shows the difference between the matched conventional 
funds and the SRI funds. The significance levels of the difference in means are based on t-tests. *, **, *** 
show significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All conventional funds (221 funds)     
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Return (monthly) 0.0037 0.0316 -0.1463 0.1385 
Volatility (monthly) 0.0072 0.0037 0.0000 0.0388 
Alpha (monthly) 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0051 0.0065 
Size (monthly, in EUR) 3.24*108 2.21*109 1.01*103 3.58*1010 
Fund age (months) 142.9922 145.0375 0.1000 1447.8330 
Fund flows (monthly) -0.0315 0.1749 -1.0258 0.4184 
Turnover ratio (annual) 0.8287 0.8864 -0.9054 4.6178 
Expense ratio (annual) 0.0121 0.0131 0.0005 0.1039 
Team dummy 0.3997 0.4899 0.0000 1.0000 
Manager experience (months) 7.8289 5.1525 0.0028 27.9861 
ESG fund score 0.5583 0.0362 0.4166 0.6204 
Environmental score 0.5536 0.0272 0.4480 0.6004 
Social fund score 0.5639 0.0234 0.4865 0.6057 
Governance fund score 0.5575 0.0228 0.4829 0.6178 
Panel B: Matched conventional funds (20 funds) 
  Return (monthly) 0.0033 0.0321 -0.1176 0.0998 
Volatility (monthly) 0.0073 0.0035 0.0022 0.0283 
Alpha (monthly) 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0039 0.0041 
Size (monthly, in EUR) 1.56*108 3.82*108 7.48*104 1.54*109 
Fund age (months) 145.0665 114.3811 0.1000 522.5333 
Fund flows (monthly) -0.0239 0.1346 -1.0258 0.4086 
Turnover ratio (annual) 0.6297 0.7772 0.0239 2.4607 
Expense ratio (annual) 0.0091 0.0034 0.0035 0.0125 
Team dummy 0.3310 0.4710 0.0000 1.0000 
Manager experience (months) 113.6684 5.3850 0.0028 21.8167 
ESG fund score 0.5598 0.0290 0.4989 0.6192 
Environmental score 0.5563 0.0205 0.5265 0.5997 
Social fund score 0.5700 0.0202 0.5202 0.6057 
Governance fund score 0.5582 0.0178 0.5245 0.6034 
Panel C: SRI funds (22 funds) 
   Return (monthly) 0.0023 0.0317 -0.1095 0.0991 
Volatility (monthly) 0.0073 0.0038 0.0023 0.0298 
Alpha (monthly) 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0042 0.0039 
Size (monthly, in EUR) 1.34*108 2.49*108 7.61*104 9.94*108 
Fund age (months) 163.0209 76.1032 55.6667 420.0667 
Fund flows (monthly) -0.0320 0.1816 -1.0258 0.4184 
Turnover ratio (annual) 0.7940 0.5943 -0.0509 2.2253 
Expense ratio (annual) 0.0134 0.0092 0.0036 0.0377 
Team dummy 0.3559 0.4791 0.0000 1.0000 
Manager experience (months) 104.1129 4.6793 0.0778 28.9195 
ESG fund score 0.5613 0.0278 0.4999 0.6178 
Environmental fund score 0.5657 0.0205 0.5295 0.5994 
Social fund score 0.5641 0.0191 0.5253 0.5991 
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SRI funds Difference 
Matched-SRI funds 
Return (monthly) 0.0027 0.0033 0.0023 0.0009 
Volatility (monthly) 0.0073 0.0073 0.0073 0.0000 
Alpha (monthly) 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 
Size (monthly, in EUR) 1.43*108 1.56*108 1.34*108 2.20*107 
Fund age (months) 154.4712 145.0665 163.0209 -17.9544*** 
Fund flows (monthly) -0.0283 -0.0239 -0.032 0.0081 
Turnover ratio (annual) 0.7119 0.6297 0.7940 -0.16425*** 
Expense ratio (annual) 0.0115 0.0091 0.0134 -0.0043*** 
Team dummy 0.3451 0.3310 0.3559 -0.0249 
Manager experience (months) 108.2462 113.6684 104.1129 9.5554*** 
ESG fund score 0.5605 0.5598 0.5613 -0.0015 
Environmental score 0.5612 0.5563 0.5657 -0.0094* 
Social fund score 0.5669 0.5700 0.5641 0.006* 
Governance fund score 0.5588 0.5582 0.5593 -0.0011 
Number of funds 44 20 22  
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Table 2. The influence of managerial characteristics on the ESG fund level. 
Table 2 shows the results of model (1) for all funds analysed (panel A), the matched conventional funds (panel B), and the SRI funds (panel C). All models are estimated with 
OLS, monthly-time variables, and robust standard errors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Matched conventional and SRI funds Panel B: Matched conventional funds Panel C: SRI funds 
  ESG Environment Social Governance ESG E S G ESG E S G 
SRI dummy 0.005* 0.0212*** -0.007*** -0.0015 
        
 
(1.66) (11.55) (-4.49) (-0.64) 
        Alpha 1.1149 0.2885 0.4864 0.1857 -0.4401 0.0737 -0.1668 -0.0994 -1.4616*** -1.1706*** -0.4986 -0.747* 
 
(0.86) (0.35) (0.71) (0.19) (-0.41) (0.15) (-0.29) (-0.17) (-3.36) (-3.72) (-1.43) (-1.82) 
Return 0.1389** 0.0694* 0.0675* 0.0896** -0.0091 0.0114 -0.0043 0.0074 -0.0522** -0.0456*** -0.023 -0.0152 
 
(2.03) (1.78) (1.71) (2.01) (-0.21) (0.64) (-0.18) (0.33) (-2.54) (-3.7) (-1.43) (-0.82) 
Volatility -0.4142 -1.363*** -0.8348** -1.2488*** -0.1454 -0.1021 -0.1531 -0.0599 -0.1749 -0.1219 -0.1446 -0.2547** 
 
(-0.53) (-3.48) (-2.18) (-2.62) (-0.43) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.36) (-1.29) (-1.46) (-1.31) (-2.02) 
Size 0.0029*** 0.0039*** 0.0023*** -0.0011** 0.0085*** -0.0008* 0.0044*** 0.0053*** -0.005*** 0.0015** -0.0009 -0.0134*** 
 
(5.01) (10.92) (7.26) (-2.2) (10.44) (-1.96) (8.23) (12.19) (-6.26) (2.21) (-1.41) (-16.5) 
Fund age -0.0101*** -0.0043*** 0.0009 -0.003** -0.0078*** 0.0049*** 0.0032*** -0.0044*** -0.0535*** -0.0391*** -0.0211*** -0.0432*** 
 
(-4.6) (-3.83) (0.83) (-2.04) (-4.72) (8.16) (2.9) (-5.64) (-21.62) (-17.35) (-12.78) (-16.54) 
Turnover 0.0141*** 0.0003 0.0102*** 0.0037*** 0.0257*** -0.0203*** 0.0098*** 0.0068*** 0.0228*** 0.0046*** 0.014*** 0.0246*** 
 
(7.08) (0.24) (8.95) (2.66) (6.17) (-8.71) (3.17) (2.86) (12.1) (2.79) (9.13) (12.49) 
Expense  1.6456*** 1.6954*** 2.03*** -0.6512*** -0.0813 0.1921 1.3537*** -1.1029*** 0.9965*** 1.4033*** 1.671*** -3.3027*** 
 
(8.45) (12.86) (17.92) (-6.41) (-0.35) (1.47) (8.56) (-9.03) (4.06) (6.11) (9.1) (-15.89) 
Flows 0.0088 -0.0007 0.004 0.0052 0.0254 0.0061 0.0089 0.0121 -0.003 -0.0063 -0.0009 0.0011 
 
(0.81) (-0.1) (0.74) (0.63) (1.53) (0.84) (0.94) (1.41) (-0.72) (-1.37) (-0.23) (0.21) 
Team 0.0007 -0.0139*** 0.0031*** 0.0146*** -0.0057* -0.0042*** -0.0049*** 0.0062*** -0.0115*** -0.02*** 0.0014 0.0103*** 
 
(0.35) (-11.28) (2.97) (11.97) (-1.71) (-2.64) (-2.71) (2.97) (-8.48) (-22.98) (1.53) (6.97) 
Man_exper -0.0013 -0.0086*** -0.0035*** 0.007*** 0.0032* -0.0036*** -0.0037*** 0.005*** -0.0181*** -0.0198*** -0.01*** 0.0195*** 
 
(-0.65) (-6.89) (-2.86) (6.6) (1.91) (-3.25) (-2.83) (5.55) (-6.69) (-6.91) (-4.32) (6.46) 
Man_change 0.0081** -0.0055 0.008*** 0.0111* -0.0051* -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0095*** 0.0012 0.0084*** -0.0001 
 
(1.98) (-1.16) (3.36) (1.92) (-1.79) (-0.77) (-0.09) (-0.4) (5.69) (1.29) (6.05) (-0.1) 
Constant 0.5315*** 0.519*** 0.5153*** 0.5679*** 0.4321*** 0.5479*** 0.4763*** 0.4761*** 0.9076*** 0.7695*** 0.6766*** 0.9117*** 
 
(31.61) (58.02) (60.73) (53.07) (37.12) (96.77) (73.18) (70.89) (50.55) (47.95) (56) (49.08) 
R2 0.2794 0.4401 0.5273 0.163 0.2418 0.2744 0.243 0.53 0.8686 0.8783 0.8633 0.6723 
No obs 1000 1000 1000 1000 480 480 480 480 520 520 520 520 
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Table 3. The influence of SRI nature and ESG fund scores on fund results. 
 
Table 3 shows the results of models (2) and (3) in panels A and B, respectively, in which alpha, return 
and flows are the dependent variables of the models (columns 1-3). All models are estimated with OLS, 
monthly-time variables, and robust standard errors. T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Model (2) results Panel B: Model (3) results 
  Alpha Return Flows 
 
Alpha Return Flows 
SRI dummy 0.0002** 0.0011 0.0172 SRI dummy 0.0005* 0.0064 0.0017 
 
(2.02) (0.63) -0.98   (1.88) (1.09) (0.07) 
ESG_score 0.0012 0.0625** 0.4186* Env_score -0.0053 -0.0655 0.2985* 
 
(0.71) (2.05) -1.66   (-0.82) (-0.37) (1.66) 
    
Social_score 0.0059 0.0206 0.2187 
    
  (0.71) (0.09) (0.21) 
    
Gov_score -0.0024 0.0888 0.0554 
    
  (-0.46) (0.56) (0.11) 
Volatility 0.0126 -0.6514* 1.6581 Volatility -0.0667*** 1.6222*** 1.8512 
 
(0.51) (-1.68) -1.01   (-5.38) (6.03) (1.09) 
Size 0.0001** 0.0008 0.0062 Size 0.0001** 0.0025** 0.2471* 
 
(2.19) (1.56) -1.2   (2.27) (2.02) (1.82) 
Fund age 0.0001 0.0038*** -0.0074 Fund age 0 -0.0006 0.0089 
 
(1.49) (2.59) (-0.58)   (-0.45) (-0.21) (0.55) 
Turnover -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.012 Turnover -0.0001 -0.0017 -0.0166 
 
(-1.64) (-0.57) (-0.92)   (-0.9) (-0.47) (-1.2) 
Expense_ratio 0.0091 0.0613 3.2376 Expense  0.0153 0.6248 4.5036 
 
(1.01) (0.32) -1.63   (0.73) (1.02) (1.43) 
Flows -0.0005** -0.0014 -0.553** Flows -0.0015*** -0.0314* -0.5447** 
 
(-2.06) (-0.21) (-2.55)   (-2.89) (-1.82) (-2.54) 
Team -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0372** Team -0.0002 -0.0076 -0.0495** 
 
(-1.01) (-0.62) (-1.99)   (-1.26) (-1.39) (-2.25) 
Man_exp -0.0002** -0.0011 -0.0397** Man_exp -0.0003** -0.0056 -0.008** 
 
(-2.24) (-0.69) (-2.48) 
 
(-2.11) (-1.48) (-2.44) 
Man_change -0.0009*** -0.0069 -0.0636 Man_change -0.0007 -0.0137 -0.0561 
 
(-3.64) (-0.55) (-1.57)   (-1.45) (-0.38) (-1.3) 
Constant -0.0015 -0.0386* -0.2448 Constant 0.0008 -0.0555 -0.3203 
 
(-1.55) (-1.94) (-1.38)   (0.32) (-0.89) (-1) 
R2 0.5881 0.8111 0.0357 R2 0.067 0.0498 0.0505 














Graph 1. QQ-plots for the ESG score of SRI and conventional funds. 
 
Graph 1.A. SRI and all conventional funds 
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